War Birds
WARCLOUDS
THE
B-18 “BOLO”
THE B-18 IN COMBAT
THE B-23 DRAGON
WORKHORSE TO WARHORSE - BIRTH OF THE C-47
MORE MODIFICATIONS
A GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY
THE ARMY LOOKS FOR A BETTER DESIGN
THE SPRUCE GOOSE
THE C-46 COMMANDO
C-47 DESIGNATIONS
THE
RECORD
War Clouds
“Of course, one of my biggest interests in the airplane is that it may prove to be the destroyer of war. I think that it will be its biggest service . . .” Henry Ford, October 1925
By the late 1930s, most Americans knew war
was coming to
The first military variants of the DC-2 were five R2D-1s supplied
to the U.S. Navy in 1934-35, two of which went to the U.S. Marines. The
R2D represented a vast improvement over the Ford Tri-Motor the Navy and
Marines had been using. The Army Air Corps followed in 1936 with an order for
the development soon to be called the XC-32. (The Army eventually purchased
three DC-2s as transports and 54 more as cargo aircraft. These cargo ships
effectively extended production of the DC-2 to September 1939.)
Major General Benjamin D. Foulois, chief of the
Army Air Corps, believed the existing civilian airliners were not capable of meeting
the military’s need for handling heavy equipment. To plan for the war, and have
inventory in place when needed, he requested bids from aircraft manufacturers
to build the Army’s fleet.
After all bids were in, and the tests completed, the Army purchased eighteen
DC-2s and designated them, C-33s. Two C-34s with the standard
DC-2 tail were ordered for the Chief of the Army Air Corps and his staff.
By 1937, modifications of the DC-2 were plentiful and the first C-33
was modified with improved landing gear, brakes, tailplane
and dorsal fin. It was called the C-38. The production model became the
C-39.
Soon afterwards General Henry “Hap” Arnold, a friend of Donald Douglas,
took over the Air Corps.
The Army also needed a new bomber design. Boeing had one design that would
eventually evolve into the famous B-17, and although it was not operational,
the Army requested bids from Boeing and two other manufacturers. The Army, in
the depth of the Great Depression, was looking to stretch its dollars. The Air
Corps opted for modest performance in setting the specifications. Their idea of
a bomber was a design that would carry a one-ton
bomb load at least 1,200 miles, at a minimum top speed of 200 miles per hour.
Donald Douglas and Glenn Martin each took a conservative approach to meeting
the Army’s requirements. Boeing, however, after their limited approach to the
247 civilian airliner, decided to adopt the “big plane”
concept, and a more radical approach with the result, the Model 299.
Martin submitted what was little more than a refinement and enlarged version
of the B-10 bomber. The Army encouraged
Boeing, in the meantime submitted what was then an astronomical figure
of $99,620 per airplane (with a minimum 220-plane order) to guarantee the
price.
Nevertheless, the Army was willing to watch the actual field trials of
these aircraft. In August 1935, the three manufacturers and the Army gathered
at
THE
B-18 “BOLO”
The Martin aircraft was eliminated early. Although the Boeing aircraft
exceeded the Army’s specifications, and was recommended by the Army’s technical
staff viewing the trails, the Army’s general staff could not swallow the price
tag of almost $100,000 per airplane. What influenced the general staff’s opinion
of the Douglas DB-1, was the price — $58,500.
As a compromise, the Army ordered 13 Y1B-17 Flying Fortresses from
Boeing and 113 DB-1 Bombers from
The B-18 had been designed around the DC-2’s wings, and the engine and enlarged tail surfaces were borrowed from the new DC-3/DST. New rounded wing tips increased the span of the bomber from eighty five-feet to eighty nine-feet, seven inches. A deeper fuselage held a six-person crew: a pilot, copilot, navigator, and three gunners handling three Browning air-cooled .30 caliber machine guns.
The B-18 “Bolo” was a shark-nosed, paunchy looking bomber.
Like its first cousin the DC-3, it was easy to maintain, and was economical.
Its similarity to its cousin also reduced some inevitable production problems
when it was phased into the
Deliveries of the B-18 bomber began on
The B-18 was not a glamorous airplane by any stretch of the imagination,
nor was it comfortable. The arrangement of the bombardier station with the nose
gunner was cramped and inefficient.
The first B-18s used Wright R-1830-45 engines rated at
930 hp each. These engines were soon replaced by R-1830-53s rated
at 1,000 hp equipped with full-feathering propellers and the aircraft was
then redesignated as the B-18A. The Army Air Corps
ordered an additional 217 B-18As at a cost of $68,800 each. The first B-18A
flew on
With the hostilities about to break loose in
The
THE B-18 IN COMBAT
When the Army realized that the B-18 was not going to be its main-line bomber, they looked again to Boeing and placed large orders for the B-17.
On
The B-18 also saw limited combat as an antisubmarine warfare type
on the East Coast of the
After the war, the surviving B-18s found their way into the civilian market. Their deep fuselage, reliable engines, and the same good reputation enjoyed by its cousins the DC-2 and DC-3 made it an in-demand airplane by cargo and small airlines.
THE B-23 DRAGON
Out of the B-18 experience emerged another design from the
For this aircraft, there was an unusual production line procedure. The Army converted an order for 38 B-18As into an order for 38 new B-23s. What was unusual was that there was no prototype (with an “X” designation), and no service-test designated aircraft (with a “Y” designation). It simply rolled off the assembly line as the B-23.
When the bomber rolled out of the hangar in July 1939, it was a study in gracefulness. It had a large vertical tail, swept-back wings of the DC-3, and a gleaming aluminum finish to its sleek fuselage that hinted at its speed. The Wright 1600 hp supercharged R-2600-3 radial engines fitted into closely packed cowlings. Even the landing gear was positioned between streamlined fairings that added a few more miles per hour to the plane’s performance. Although the wing and horizontal surfaces were similar to the DC-3 (and B-18), the B-23 was a completely new airplane. The aircraft looked like the high performance airplane the Army needed.
For all its sleek styling and design, the B-23 received the seemingly
inappropriate name, “Dragon.” On its first test flight on
The aerial war in
Although in early 1940, production models of the B-23 Dragon entered
operational deployment in the
The B-23 Dragon did serve several useful purposes that led to major improvements in aerial warfare. After extensive cabin and airframe modifications the B-23 was used as a testbed for a pressurized cabin, with pressurization coming from superchargers mounted in the engine nacelles. From the results of this testing, technological innovations were incorporated directly into the B-29 Superfortress.
The B-23 was also used as a glider tug. It was one of the first
The price tag on the B-23 was a comfortable $133,000. When compared to the newly developed B-17 bomber the B-23 was a “bargain basement bomber.” None ever saw combat and eighteen were modified to become VIP transports for high ranking officers. The B-23 was extensively modified by removing the armor plating and machine guns. Extra windows and plushed up interiors turned this war plane into an Army executive airplane. In this configuration it was redesignated the UC-67.1
After the war, the surviving B-23 and UC-67 airframes became
surplus and bought quickly by corporations that wanted a fast, comfortable executive
aircraft. About 20 of these aircraft found their way into the civilian market.
In the civilian configuration it seated
The executive Dragon was a classy way to travel and it remained popular
until the executive business jets made the scene. Afterwards, most went out to
pasture or to small companies which could not afford the newer and more expensive
airplanes. Several were destroyed in drug smuggling operations. At least eight
are still in existence with one airworthy in
WORKHORSE TO WARHORSE —BIRTH OF THE C-47
In July 1939, the C-47 was on the drawing board. When war broke out
in
On
In Early 1942, the massive wartime orders began to pour into the
While the sudden war-time production needs may have caught the Douglas
Santa Monica plant flat-footed in 1941,
The government helped by putting the
Although the first C-53s were delivered in late 1941, and the first C-47s in early 1942, they fell woefully short of the Army’s demand for some time. It was only in early 1944 did the supply of C-47s and its variants begin to keep pace with the demand.
From outward appearances, the C-47 was almost the twin sister of
the DC-3, and based on the same engineering design. Beneath the looks, the
C-47 production presented many opportunities for
The original tubular steel engine mounting rings on the DC-3 were
costly to manufacture. Tubular steel was in great demand, and short supply.
Henry Guerin, who started with
Other parts of the airplane, fairings, access panels, cowls, and wing fillets once formed by hand, were now consigned to Guerin’s presses or stretch-formed over dies. The objective was to develop a machine tool or technique to replace a hand tool operation. Rivet machines replaced hand riveting, and combined, the improved production techniques cut manufacturing time by 50 percent.
To meet the war-time production schedule of C-47s engineers developed procurement procedures, inspection methods and technical specifications unheard of just a few years before.
Precisely tooled steel jigs, replaced jigs made of wood. New test procedures, anti-fungus treatments, lacquers, primers, aqueous cleaners, paint for various ferrous, and non ferrous metals, and organic protective paints were among dozens of new items needed.
Douglas engineers accomplished these objectives in time to produce in quantity and quality not only thousands of C-47s, but dozens of other bomber, and fighter types, in quantities that exceeded 29,000 aircraft.
To achieve this massive output Douglas relied heavily on subcontractors, among them a future partner, the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation. In 1940, in its second year of operation, McDonnell received its first C-47 subcontract for 576 sets of empennage assemblies and spares. Other contracts followed, and by the end of the war McDonnell had manufactured over 10,000 empennage assemblies for the C-47.7
The stability characteristics and general flight performance of the C-47 were comparable to the conventional DC-3 airliner. However, the C-47 was designed to transport heavy cargo and had a lower performance curve than the DC-3, although more powerful engines were installed.
The C-47 outwardly resembled the DC-3 in every detail, except two: The addition of a navigator’s dome (astrodome) above and just behind the cockpit, and the other more distinguishing feature, the “barn door” on the left side of the aircraft. There were subtle differences too, like six inches added to the wing center section, cutting nine inches off the length and reducing the fuel capacity of 882 gallons to 805 gallons. For ferry flights of the C-47, the interior could hold eight 100-gallon tanks and later models could carry nine tanks. The cylindrical plastic and rubberized tanks were held in wooden cradles.
MORE MODIFICATIONS
Arthur Raymond said, “The C-47 wasn’t a very hard airplane to sell, it was just a question of putting the right type of door on it.” Selling the plane was the easy part. Building it was another story. The Army wanted a large cargo loading door, and this was a major challenge. Douglas engineers realized that to cut the door opening, it would be necessary to reinforce the airframe or the tail would fall off. Once they had that problem solved, a new one cropped up. With the new door opening, the Army could roll a Jeep or small artillery piece into the airplane, but the flooring would not support the weight. Reinforcing the floor added even more weight to the plane.
Weights and balance experts tackled the problem. They trimmed and changed the shape of the rudder and stabilizer slightly until they got the desired results.
From the Douglas specifications we find the most accurate description of the C-47 interior. “Provisions are made for the alternate stowage of litters or seats for troops. Bucket seats, made of plywood or aluminum alloy, are folded against the sides of the fuselage when cargo is stowed aboard. Exit for paratroopers is by means of a small door that can be removed from the inside in flight. The paratrooper’s exit door is part of the forward cargo door. Both forward and aft cargo doors swing on external extension type hinges and can be removed to facilitate loading of freight. All aircraft of this type have the cargo doors located on the left side. By means of cargo tie-down rings and other supports, cargo is lashed down prior to flight operations. No insulation or soundproofing is provided in the main cargo compartment. External parapack racks can be carried and jettisoned during paratroop operations. In order to facilitate loading and moving of engines in cradles, the reinforced floor has several corrugations on which the engine cradles may roll. There are also fittings on the underside of the center section of the wing to permit attachment of two spare propellers. Cargo slings, snatch blocks, and other equipment are used to facilitate handling of military cargo. Plywood loading ramps assist the loading and unloading of airborne task force equipment.”
Every C-47 was test flown before acceptance by the Army. This procedure and the results are a testimony to the dedication of the men and women who built this legend.
As a C-47 rolled off the assembly line, a final inspector would certify the plane ready to fly. A test pilot would fly it through dozens of tests. If any defects appeared, the aircraft returned to the repair hangar. After the repairs, it went through the tests again. The aircraft seldom failed this second flight test.
The Long Beach facility manufactured 4,285 C-47s among thousands of other aircraft and remarkably, there was only one C-47 test pilot fatality and that occurred in a later test, not an initial flight.
Arthur Pearcy, in his book, The Dakota, relates that he was witness to the RAF receiving C-47s (Dakotas) with only two hours and 15 minutes on the airframe, and the planes performed perfectly.
In June 1941, the Army ordered 100 C-53s. In September, they ordered an additional 70 C-47s and 50 more C-53s but at the time of Pearl Harbor, they had only fifty C-33s in their inventory.
A GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY
The C-47’s first flight occurred in November 1941, and Douglas delivered the first ship on December 23, 1941. It would have a strong influence on the outcome of the war.
The Army had a nagging question. Could the C-47 handle a global responsibility? The Civil Aeronautics Board had limited the load a civilian DC-3 could carry to 5,000 pounds, on long flights of 600-700 miles. War required longer flights and more capacity.
Because the DC-3 was the only proven multi-engine transport in use at the time and available in quantity, it had the job of handling this global responsibility. In early 1942, the Civil Aeronautics Board studied the DC-3’s operating range, and payload. It concluded that the DC-3/C-47 could operate, “ . . . with an overload to 31,000 pounds gross weight, and could obtain maximum range and maximum payload not withstanding any provisions of the civil air regulations to the contrary . . . the administrator may at his discretion permit an air carrier to exceed the gross of all cargo and passengers if necessary to the prosecution of the war effort, or the preservation of life.” Much double talk to say “yes.”
THE ARMY LOOKS FOR A BETTER DESIGN
It was almost anticlimactic. The Douglas Aircraft Company totally revised its production facilities to fill the Army’s C-47 orders.
Although the Army ordered hundreds of C-47s, and had input throughout the design and manufacturing process they were not happy with the results. Eventually they accepted the C-47, reluctantly. Some of the Army’s difficulties with the C-47 were: The tail wheel made it difficult to load cargo from a truck. Its payload was too light (using the civilian 5,000 pound limit) and they considered the aircraft obsolete at the time of Pearl Harbor. The government decided to spend millions of dollars looking for a better airplane.
The Army also wanted a different cargo plane because they felt the C-47 would compete with bomber and fighter production. Their priority was a transport that would use non-strategic materials like wood and stainless steel, leaving materials like tubular steel and aluminum for the tactical aircraft.
One aircraft given serious consideration was the stainless steel Budd-93. It looked promising as the C-47’s replacement until major engineering problems kept it on the ground.
Another contender was the all-wood Waco C-62. It also had significant engineering problems and a lower production priority than gliders. It, too, fell by the wayside.
One aircraft that came closest to replacing the C-47 was the all-wood Curtiss-Wright C-76 “Caravan.” This design progressed to the test flight stage and tended to be unstable in flight. It also needed more power. After several crashes, the Army dropped it from contention.
The search continued and the Army turned up the Fairchild C-82 “Packet,” another wooden aircraft that seemed to fit the Army’s specifications. It would not be available until 1945, too late to help the war effort. Besides, by 1945, the C-47 would be the undisputed Queen of the skies.
THE SPRUCE GOOSE
One aircraft design that was a colossal attempt at solving two problems of non-strategic materials and gross tonnage was undertaken by Henry J. Kaiser, the auto manufacturer, and the well-known builder of the “Liberty Ships.”
Kaiser had President Roosevelt’s tentative backing of a plan to build a series of huge flying boats, made of non-strategic materials and designed to fly cargo and troops across the Atlantic. The War Production Board was dubious about the plan’s feasibility, and asked Donald Douglas to join with the other aircraft industry executives to examine Kaiser’s proposal. Among the executives were “Dutch” Kindelberger, Jack Northrop, Claude Ryan, and Grover Loening. Arthur Raymond who also attended the meeting recounted what happened.
“The Board gave Kaiser a thorough going over, and asked some pertinent questions. At one point, Kaiser became visibly unsettled and annoyed. He then announced a partnership with Howard Hughes to build the first flying boat and claimed he didn’t need support from the established aircraft industry. The partnership lasted about a month. Kaiser withdrew and left Hughes to design and build the flying boat himself.”
Raymond continued, “Hughes called me in the middle of the night to ask me how to design the nacelles. He wanted to know if we had anyone, he could borrow to help him. We didn’t want his project to fail so we let Hughes borrow Gene Root, as a consultant. Gene designed the tail section of Hughes’ plane and helped with the aerodynamics.
“After he finished the aircraft it was a long time before it flew. Hughes finally flew it himself to fulfill the contract requirement. I think he reached an altitude of about 13 feet. It never flew again.”
THE C-46 COMMANDO
Of the dozens of designs created on paper and in mock-up, few even made it to the runway. One of those that did, and for a short time looked like the C-47’s replacement, was the Curtiss-Wright C-46 “Commando.”
The first version of the “Commando” was a civilian airliner, designated CW-20, and supposedly the answer to the Douglas DC-3. It had two engines, but greater range, and carried more payload. In the early development stages, engineers thought it would give the Douglas heavy competition and probably replace it. When the first flight took place on March 20, 1940, none of the airlines had placed orders for the new airplane. War clouds on the horizon and rumors that the aircraft had serious bugs, made the airlines shy away. The DC-3 was filling all their needs. By this time, the DC-3 had also acquired the nick-name, “The Bugless Douglas.”
The Army bought the few CW-20s that came off the line and converted them to a cargo configuration. They assigned it the designation “C-46 Commando.”
The rumors were correct. From the start, the C-46 had serious problems. When it rained, it leaked like a sieve, not through the windshield as some DC-3s, but throughout the fuselage. In heavy rain, it leaked so badly the Army grounded it until the manufacturer repaired the poorly welded seams.
Two serious problems were fuel and hydraulic leaks. Control surface and landing gear hydraulic lines would suddenly burst from vibrations. In-flight repairs were sometimes effective, but usually manual back-up systems were the only things that saved the day.
Another problem was keeping a coat of paint on the plane. The camouflage paint kept peeling from the aircraft. In August 1942, the Army asked the manufacturer for 53 immediate modifications and 46 more “desirable” changes. The aircraft had so many serious bugs that the Army returned the first 30 to the factory for corrective action.
When the C-46A rolled out in 1943, it was not much better. Between May 1943 and March 1945 there were 31 incidents of Air Transport Command C-46As catching fire and exploding in mid air. Dozens of C-46s were reported “missing” but not from direct enemy action. The wreckage of many is still buried somewhere in the jungles of Burma. It did not take long for the Army pilots to nick-name it the “Flying Coffin.” Today, about 38 of the 181 manufactured are still flying in the United States and perhaps another 50 throughout the world.
Through the process of elimination or trial and error, the Army eventually concluded the under-rated Douglas C-47 was their best first-line cargo plane. The evidence was empirical. The C-47 would fly under most conditions, it was easy to maintain, and most significant of all, it was being produced in quantity and quality.
The true cost of looking for a C-47 replacement can never accurately be determined. There is, however, an indication of just how much was spent. In 1943 dollars, Howard Hughes’ “Spruce Goose” cost the government $18 million and Hughes added another $7 million of his own money to the project. The Army spent an additional $40 million more in non-recoverable resources, looking for a replacement for the C-47. Some estimates put the government’s investment over $100 million looking for the Gooney Bird’s replacement.
C-47 DESIGNATIONS
Although the C-47 was a universal transport the constant military modifications resulted in such an assortment of models and designations, it became difficult to track them. In all, there were more than 50 different versions, all having their roots in the DC-2 and DC-3. Most of the Army designations signified either Wright or Pratt & Whitney engines, with minor variations in horsepower, gear ratios, and interior changes. This was the principal reason that led to the confusing set of designations of the DC-3/C-47. For example, the C-53 was a DC-3 transport with room for 24-28 paratroopers. The Army wanted to keep track of all the aircraft under civilian lease in the event that they were eventually needed. They devised the designation scheme and assigned it to almost every aircraft that had any modification. To add to this confusion, they included all engine variations. The DC-3s had civilian engines with the manufacturer’s designations. Often the engines of the drafted airliners retained these designations while others received the Army’s equivalent military designations that combined the type (R for radial), the displacement to the nearest five cubic inches and a sequential dash number (e.g., R-1830-92, which identified the Pratt & Whitney “Twin Wasp”). Normally the even dash numbers were assigned to the Navy and the odd dash numbers assigned to the Army contracts. With the large interchange of equipment between the services, many USAAF machines flew with engines built under Navy contracts.
The Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard used their own system, which was much simpler to follow than the Army’s alphabet soup. They did not assign a new designation for such items as engine changes, interior, or electrical system changes as the Army did. When a significant change or modification warranted a new identifying symbol, they assigned a new “dash” number to the type. For a special purpose, they used an alpha suffix after the dash. The R4D-1 was the Navy’s version of the standard commercial DC-3.
The R4D-2Z was a VIP model. The Navy moved its aircraft constantly between itself and the Marine Corps. This complicates the accounting of Navy and Marine aircraft, and adds to the confusion in the official records as to aircraft assignments.
Beside the confusing set of alpha-numerics, an error at the Douglas plants in Long Beach and Oklahoma City resulted in the misnumbering of 3,378 aircraft. The numbers were corrected as follows, the second number being the incorrect number, 25224/13779 to 27223/15778 (1,999 aircraft); 32527/15779 to 33626/16878 (1,099 aircraft); 34129/18548 through 34409/18565 received: to and 16879 to 17142 (280 aircraft).16 The numbers, allocated to A-26 bombers in another plant were used and the error went undetected until many aircraft left the plant. Douglas notified the Army of the right serial numbers, but many aircraft were not renumbered. On the FAA records today, some survivors are carrying both numbers. Others carry their Army registration number and a few even carry a mystery number.
All these changes have led to confusion, and have made it almost impossible for aviation historians and buffs to trace some individual aircraft by model, or serial number. Another confusing point to some people is the fact that many drafted airline machines from the C-48 through the C-53s, C-68, and C-84 were in service long before the C-47 and sometimes had lower construction numbers in spite of their higher model designations. This happened because the C-47 designation appeared and was assigned during pre-contract discussions but the serial numbers not assigned until after the C-48, etc. designations had been made and Army serial numbers assigned to them. After the war, the returning DSTs that had been converted had lost their upper berth windows, making it even more difficult to learn from external inspection, the identity of the original model.
THE RECORD
By the end of the war, the C-47 had carried 22 million tons of goods, and flown 67 million passenger-miles. The airliner’s DC-3s under the Air Transport Command logged on the average, 15-19 hours a day in the air.
Douglas built 10,629 DC-3/C-47s. This lusty breed joined the rest of the Douglas clan which became so prolific that at one point, on the average, a Douglas-built plane took off or landed somewhere around the world every six seconds, every minute, twenty-four hours a day, Sundays and holidays included. Surely Donald Douglas had created an airborne empire on which the sun never set.
IN SUMMARY
There have been many attempts to accurately record the production figures for the DC-3/C-47 and the variants. There was the problem of misnumbered aircraft serial numbers, some historians counted remanufactured aircraft twice and the problem of Army “acceptances” of aircraft from the Long Beach and Oklahoma City facilities. From McDonnell Douglas records there were 10,632 machines built. Santa Monica manufactured 527 machines through December 1941 (including 38 DSTs). All of the prewar DST/DC-3 airliners were built in Santa Monica.
That plant produced an additional 439 machines through July 1943, and the total number of military machines made in Santa Monica was 382. The 382 military variants coming out of the Santa Monica shop included: 159 C-53Ds, 219 C-53s, 2 R4Ds, and the single C-41 and C-41A. Another 149 were requisitioned off the assembly line and went directly into the Army. (Twenty-two Santa Monica Army models were transferred to the Navy, but the Navy also requisitioned 12 DC-3s from the factory on its own.)
This made 531 DC-3s delivered to the military as new airplanes, leaving 435 delivered to the airlines and other owners. (The Army requisitioned 94 more DC-3s after they had entered civilian service, including the Douglas-owned company ship, which became a special C-53.) Six hundred twenty-five of the 966 Santa Monica DC-3s, or 64.6 percent, went into the U.S. Armed Forces. The total production for Santa Monica was 966 DC-3s. In spite of the big military bite into the Santa Monica production, the DC-3 is still a record holder. No civilian transport before or since has been built in such numbers in the short period of six years, 1936-1941.
The Long Beach factory was strictly for military orders producing a total of 4,285 C-47s and variants, all but 66 of the 4,285 were built under Army contracts. Many of these were supplied to foreign countries under Lend Lease or were transferred directly to the Navy after being built with Army designations and serial numbers. Sixty-six were original Navy R4D-1s; the others were all C-47s through C-47Bs.
Military orders placed with the Oklahoma City plant totaled 6,928, but only 5,381 were actually delivered, the balance being canceled at the end of the war. The 5,381 included 28 completed as civilian DC-3Ds.
The total military versions of the DC-3 (C-47 et al) were 10,291, or 96.79 percent of production. Douglas records also show that of the 10,632 machines built, three were built as spares, and this figure also does not include the post war DC-3C, DC-3D and DC-3S (Super DC-3), which were remanufactured airframes and in the case of the Super DC-3 assigned new construction numbers. The final tally of DC-3s manufactured in the United States is 10,629 (plus three as spares) for 10,632. An additional 487 Japanese DC-3s were manufactured by the Showa Company and according to one reliable source, 6,157 Russian Li-2s were manufactured bringing the grand total for the type to 17,273.